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WONG, Chi Shing  
 
 
Abstract 
Given the adoption of the linked exchange rate since October 1983, fiscal policy 
becomes the only measurement for stabilizing the Hong Kong economy. This paper 
attempts to establish a framework for evaluating the fiscal effect to prevent the 
abuse of fiscal measures. The empirical study of Jha et al. (2010) revealed the 
significant negative impact of fiscal effect in Hong Kong, which violates the classical 
view of fiscal policy. A similar result has been found by adopting another structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) model proposed by Ravn et al. (2007). An omission of 
control variables in the quantitative model is possible. The MSCI AC (All countries) 
Pacific Index has been introduced as an international block in the SVAR model 
proposed by Ravn et al. (2007). The fiscal effect becomes positive and standardizes 
with the previous fiscal studies. The replacement of investment variable in the 
modified model suggests that positive fiscal innovation does not encounter with the 
crowding out effect on investment. The estimations for the decomposition policy 
expenditures indicate that compositional effect exists, and it undermines the fiscal 
multiplier. The estimations also reveal that the innovation in recurrent expenditure 
contributes mainly to the fiscal effect. With the persistence and significant impact 
on output, concentrating on infrastructure expenditure is the recommendation on 
Hong Kong fiscal policy to maximize the expansionary effect in the short run. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal and monetary policies are the two measures for stabilizing the economic 
fluctuation during the business cycle. Nevertheless, the latter one cannot be applied 
in Hong Kong. The currency board system has been adopted again by the Hong Kong 
government since 1983, and the capital is almost freely flowed. Mundell (1963) and 
Fleming (1962) suggested that any independent monetary policy cannot be applied 
given the existence of the fixed exchange rate and capital mobility. The only 
measure left for the Hong Kong government is the fiscal policy.  
Even though the Hong Kong government realises that it has a substantial policy 
implication in the fiscal policy, it does not have any scientific and sophisticated 
framework for evaluating the fiscal effect on the economy quantitatively. The 
government just intends to accumulate its reserves and restricts its expenditures. 
Tang (1997) pointed out that the Hong Kong government prioritizes financial 
stability over economic stability when making decisions on public finance. The 
statistics also reveal this fiscal behaviour. Figure 1 indicates that the government has 
fiscal surplus in recent eight years consecutively. However, Figure 2 reveals that 
there is a slowdown of recurrent expenditure growth in recent years. The average 
annual growth of the recurrent expenditure from 2003 to 2010 is 1.5 percent, which 
is far below average 20 years annual growth rate 7.4 percent.  
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The society has disapproved of this fiscal practice in recent years. Conflicts 
between the government and the public were therefore aroused. The Old Allowance 
was pressured to increase into $1,000 in 2008. The Mandatory Provision Fund (MPF) 
injection scheme in the 2011–2012 Budget was “U-turned” into a cash distribution 
scheme, which is Scheme $6,000. The policy on public finance tends to become 
populistic given the huge reserves for welfare distribution. However, the fiscal 
suggestion from populists may not be rational or even beneficial to the whole 
society. Establishing a framework with scientific foundation is essential to prevent 
the abuse of fiscal measures.  
This thesis attempts to identify the fiscal impact on the Hong Kong macro 
economy using the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. SVAR model is a 
standard approach for studying the quantitative effect of fiscal policy. However it is 
not desirable that we adopt the model from other literatures without modification. 
The estimation would not be standardized with literatures as the identification is not 
suitable to the uniqueness of Hong Kong’s economy. Hong Kong is a small open 
economy which involves various trading activities while the existing SVAR models 
from literatures do not incorporate this economic characteristic. One of the 
solutions for tackling this problem is introducing some control variables which 
capture the trading condition in the modified SVAR model. 
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Further disaggregation on fiscal spending is performed to compare the effects 
on different policy expenditures. The result shows that each policy spending has 
various quantitative effects. Together with the composition of total government 
expenditure, it is concluded that the nature of fiscal expenditure matters on the 
fiscal impact. The comparison of fiscal estimations for other “Asian Dragons”, i.e. 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, further supports this conclusion. The fiscal 
effect on output in Hong Kong and Singapore are much narrowed than South Korea 
and Taiwan, given that Hong Kong and Singapore governments have similar 
expenditure pattern.  
The modified SVAR model established in this thesis can be an empirical 
framework in evaluating their fiscal impacts in Hong Kong quantitatively. It filled in 
the blank of empirical fiscal policy study in Hong Kong. This study also provides a 
direction to the government for preparing the fiscal policy. Given a limited fiscal 
resource, the government can determine which policy expenditure should have the 
largest proportion in their fiscal policy if the main objective is stimulating the output 
in the short run.   
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
literature review of empirical studies on fiscal policy in Hong Kong and other 
economies. Section 3 discusses the identification of the SVAR model and the 
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estimation. Section 4 provides the analysis of the decomposition of fiscal effect by 
policy. Section 5 compares the quantitative fiscal effects with other three “Asian 
Dragons”. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In the ISLM model, the increase in government expenditure is an effective 
measure to stimulate aggregate demand. With the extension of Mundell (1963) and 
Fleming (1962), the prediction suggests that the fiscal multiplier will be larger if a 
fixed exchange rate is present and capital is mobile. Nevertheless, the recent 
empirical study with the SVAR representation of the data does not have a consistent 
conclusion on fiscal effect. In the study of Jha et al. (2010), 10 regions of Asian 
economies are examined, including Hong Kong. For the estimation on Hong Kong, 
the impulse response to a positive public spending shock from their SVAR model is 
negative and significant for real output and private consumption. This finding 
violates the Keynesian theory prediction that expansionary fiscal policy will result in 
an increase in consumption and output. The possibility of obtaining contradictory 
results may be attributed to the misspecification of the model. Conducting a 
comprehensive review on the empirical literature and selecting an appropriate 
model for the studies of Hong Kong fiscal policy are therefore necessary. 
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2.1. Literature Review on Hong Kong Fiscal Policy 
A standard approach or benchmark model for estimating the impact of fiscal 
policy in Hong Kong does not exist. Freris (1989) adopted a simple linear Keynesian 
aggregate demand function with the average and marginal propensity to fiscal 
surplus for estimating whether the budget is expansionary. The result shows that 
the expansionary budget positively contributes to the aggregate demand from the 
1970s to the 1980s. Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2000) and Peng et al. (2003) 
adopted the method of decomposition of fiscal balance to gauge the multiplier 
effect from fiscal impulse in the late 1990s to the early 2000s. They concluded that it 
has an expansionary effect on output in most of the years. In short, literature 
proposes that fiscal impulse does have an expansionary effect on the Hong Kong 
economy for a long period of time. Further doubts are therefore incurred from Jha 
et al.’s (2010) SVAR result of the negative response on real output and private 
consumption from a positive fiscal innovation.  
 
2.2. Literature Review on the SVAR Model of Fiscal Policy 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) are pioneers in adopting the SVAR approach in 
identifying the dynamic responses from the government spending on U.S. activities 
during the post-war period. The results of their research consistently show that a 
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positive government spending shock has an expansionary effect on U.S. output. 
Numerous scholars have further extended and applied their approach in different 
economies for fiscal effect studies. Giordano et al. (2007) employed a five-variable 
SVAR model to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on private GDP, inflation, and 
the long-term interest rate in Italy. A shock to government purchase of goods and 
services has a sizeable and robust effect on the Italian economy. Ilzetzki et al. (2010) 
examined the impact of fiscal shocks in 44 countries using the SVAR panel model. 
They reported that the fiscal multiplier is relatively large if the country is 
industrialised, low in debt, low in degree of openness for trade, or has a 
predetermined exchange rate. Afonso and Sousa (2009) further extended the SVAR 
approach to investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and its impact on 
asset markets in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy.  
The fiscal studies in a small open economy conducted by Buckle et al. (2007) 
and Dungey and Fry (2007) focused on the identification of the SVAR model in the 
economy of New Zealand. Both studies adopted a block exogeneity approach in 
their SVAR models. New Zealand is considered as a small open economy that has a 
high correlation with the world economy; hence, international blocks as control 
variables are necessary for the SVAR model of a small open economy. Buckle et al. 
(2007) included foreign real output, interest rates, real asset returns, and the foreign 
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currency price of New Zealand trade as international blocks. Dungey and Fry (2007) 
further modified the specification. Instead of including the interaction between the 
variables of the international blocks, they incorporated them into the SVAR model 
only as purely exogenous variables. 
The SVAR approach has an advantage in terms of the high degree of flexibility. 
The approach is easily extended by introducing more macro variables with simple 
restrictions. Each impulse response of the endogenous variable can be identified 
from the hypothetical fiscal innovation through simulation. Therefore, observing the 
quantitative effect of fiscal policy on the macro economy is convenient. 
Nevertheless, weaknesses are aroused when the SVAR approach is adopted. One of 
the most highly criticized weaknesses is the fragile micro-foundation of the 
approach. For example, the SVAR model does not usually include the intertemporal 
budget constraints for consumers and the government.  
To cope with the problem, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model is used as an alternative because it attempts to explain the behaviour of 
agents aggregately by analysing the interaction of microeconomic decisions. Ravn et 
al. (2007) first employed the SVAR model for the preliminary analysis of fiscal effect 
on a panel of four industrialized countries including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, over the post-Bretton Woods period. They 
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discovered that a positive innovation in government spending causes an expansion 
in output and consumption, deterioration of the trade balance, and depreciation of 
the real exchange rate. The DSGE model on two-country model has been 
constructed to gauge the observed effects of government spending shocks based on 
the deep habit mechanism developed by Ravn et al. (2006). The impulse responses 
of output, consumption, trade balance, and real exchange rate predicted by the 
deep-habit model match remarkably with their empirical counterparts. With the 
support of the DSGE model and simulations, the SVAR model adopted by Ravn et al. 
(2007) is justified as the benchmark model for analysing fiscal impact in Hong Kong. 
 
3. Identification of the Structural VAR Model 
3.1. Original Model  
3.1.1. Identification 
In the study of Ravn et al. (2007), the original SVAR model is in the following 
form:  
     (1) 
where gt denotes real per capita government expenditure, yt denotes real GDP per 
capita, and ct denotes real per capita private consumption of nondurables and 
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services. All of them are deflated by the GDP deflator. nxyt denotes the net 
export-to-GDP ratio, and et denotes the real exchange rate. A hat over a variable 
denotes the log deviation from trend, except for nxyt, for which it indicates the level 
deviation from trend. All variables are seasonally adjusted through the moving 
average method. Moreover, they are detrended with a linear and quadratic trend 
into a stationary form. The factor B(L) ≡ B0 + B1L + B2L
2 + . . . denotes a lag 
polynomial, with L denoting the lag operator.  
The SVAR model proposed by Ravn et al. (2007) follows the argument of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that government expenditure responds with at least 
one quarter lag to the structure innovations other than innovations to government 
expenditure itself. Moreover, no other innovations of variables can affect 
government expenditure (i.e., government expenditure is purely exogenous in this 
SVAR model). Here the identification adopted is the recursive system from the 
Cholesky decomposition (i.e., the shock of the variable will not have 
contemporaneous effect on variables that are higher ranked). For example, the 
innovation of  consists of innovations  and , but not others. Hence, the 
innovation of  is purely exogenous in the model, which follows the Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) setting. It includes four quarter lags for each series; hence, the 
matrices of coefficients Bi and A are of size 5 by 5. 
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3.1.2. Data 
The linked exchange rate has been adopted since October 1983. The time 
series data adopted in the model are between 1984 and 2010 on a quarterly basis. 
Instead of using per capita data as adopted by Ravn et al. (2007), aggregate real 
output, consumption and government expenditure are adopted in the following 
estimations. All of them are from the Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 
except the real exchange rate. The latter is from the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS). Based on the BIS definition, an increase in the real exchange rate 
means the appreciation of the domestic country. 
 
3.1.3. Estimation 
Figure 3 illustrates the estimation that follows the identification of Ravn et al. 
(2007). Given a positive innovation of government expenditure, an increase in 
private consumption and deterioration of the trade balance occur. They match with 
the qualitative results found by Ravn et al. (2007). However, the appreciation of 
domestic currency and insignificant impact on GDP diverge from their results.  
One of the possible reasons for the contradictory results is the misidentification 
on the SVAR model. Originally the SVAR model proposed by Ravn et al. (2007) 
studied the fiscal effect on a panel of four industrialized countries. These four 
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economies are sizable compared to the Hong Kong economy. The regional or global 
shocks might have a less impact on the four economies, but significant on Hong 
Kong relatively. Based on the studies of Buckle et al. (2007) and Dungey and Fry 
(2007), block exogeneity approach would be required for a small open economy like 
Hong Kong. Therefore, at least one international block should be introduced to 
control the impact of the external economic environment. 
 
3.2. Modified Model  
3.2.1. Introduction of International Block 
Openness of trade has been one of the main features of the Hong Kong 
economy since the 18th century. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the degree of importance 
of trading activities to the Hong Kong economy. Among the four key industries, 
which consist of over half of the GDP share, the trading industry accounts for about 
25 percent of the total GDP in the latest decade. Moreover, over one-fifth of the 
total employment is related to the trading since 2000. These results further support 
the argument that trading is one of the key activities in the Hong Kong economy. 
Therefore, introducing an international block into the SVAR model proposed by Ravn 
et al. (2007) to control the trading condition is justified. Moreover, an increase in 
trading relation between Hong Kong and Asia-Pacific countries ensues. Figure 6 
12 
 
illustrates the ratio of total trade volume between Hong Kong and Asia-Pacific 
countries. The ratio rose from about 50% in 1984 to over 70% in 2010.1 The 
indicator selected for international block should be incorporated with the 
characteristics of the above stylized facts. 
The domestic trading activities are usually correlated with the economic 
performance of trading partners positively. Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) provides equity indexes in evaluating global and regional economic 
performances. In the Asia-Pacific region, the MSCI AC (All countries) Pacific Index 
can be a proxy for evaluating the general economic performance of Asia-Pacific 
countries. The index, which was started in the fourth quarter of 1987, is updated on 
a monthly basis. The index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted 
index, and consists of the following 12 developed and emerging market countries.2 
The stylized facts on the trading activities in Hong Kong can be incorporated by this 
indicator to a certain degree. Hence, selecting the MSCI AC Pacific Index as an 
international block to control the trading environment is justified. 
After the introduction of international block, the modified SVAR model takes 
the following form: 
                                                     
1
 The figures are believed to be undermined. Only the top 10 countries in terms of trading volume 
are reported by the Census and Statistics Department. 
2
 It includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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     (2) 
where apt is MSCI AC Pacific Index. A hat over apt denotes the log deviation from 
trend. It is also seasonally adjusted through the moving average method and 
detrended with a linear and quadratic trend into a stationary form. The lag 
operation B(L) is identical to the previous SVAR model proposed by Ravn et al. 
(2007). The matrices of coefficients Bi and A are of size 6 by 6 after the introduction. 
Nevertheless, the identification adopted as the recursive system does not strictly 
follow the Cholesky decomposition. According to Dungey and Fry’s (2007) 
modification of the SVAR model for the New Zealand economy, international block 
variables were incorporated into the model as exogenous variables. Thus, the 
innovation of  does not include the innovation of  even it is the highest 
ranked variable.  and  are both considered as exogenous and without 
interaction in the modified SVAR model.  
 
3.2.2. Estimation  
Figure 7 illustrates the estimation from the modified SVAR model with the 
block. Given a positive innovation of government expenditure, an increase in private 
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consumption and deterioration of trade balance ensue. Quantitatively, a 1 percent 
increase in government expenditure will result in a 0.24 percent increase in private 
consumption and a 0.2 percent decrease in net export to output ratio. Moreover, 
the impulse response of output is positive, and the real exchange rate depreciates. A 
1 percent positive impulse from government spending will raise output by 0.06 
percent, and lower the real exchange rate by 0.09 percent. The qualitative results 
now correspond to Ravn et al.’s (2007) estimation of the fiscal effect on the four 
industrialized countries. The expansionary effect of fiscal impulse on output is also 
consistent with previous Hong Kong fiscal literatures results qualitatively.3 
Nonetheless, the quantitative results from the modified model significantly 
differ from the estimation conducted by Ravn et al. (2007). Compared to their result 
of a 0.05 percent decrease in net export to output ratio, the deterioration of the 
trade balance is more severe in the case of Hong Kong. In addition, the real 
exchange rate depreciation is limited, probably due to the linked exchange rate and 
the stickiness of prices. An increase in government expenditure stimulates import 
demand. However, due to the stickiness of the real exchange rate, the increase in 
export demand is undermined. The severe deterioration of the trade balance can be 
                                                     
3
 The estimation from the modified model is robust even if different time series data are adopted. 
Annual data has been adopted for the estimation. Given that the test consists of 22 observations of 
the annual data, the lagging period has to be reduced for estimation. A two-year lag is therefore 
selected for the lag operator. Figure 8 presents the estimation from the modified SVAR model with 
annual data. It is consistent with the estimation based on quarterly data qualitatively. 
15 
 
explained by a limited degree of depreciation.  
The fiscal impact on output estimated from the modified model is also 
narrowed. In the estimation by Ravn et al. (2007), the government spending 
multiplier, , for four industrialized countries is 0.52 based on the 
assumption that the government share is 19 percent.4 Tang (1997) stated that the 
Hong Kong government has restricted the size of the public sector5 to 20 percent 
since the 1960s. The government spending multiplier in Hong Kong is about 0.35 
given the restriction, which is much smaller than the estimation results of Ravn et al. 
(2007) even though the fiscal impact on consumption is much larger. The severe 
deterioration of the trade balance may explain a certain degree of the reduction of 
the multiplier. The findings of Ilzetzki et al. (2010) also suggested that the fiscal 
multiplier is relatively larger in large closed economies than in small open ones. 
They argued that the result is consistent with the models proposed by Mundell 
(1963) and Fleming (1962). Part of the increase in aggregate demand would be met 
by a reduction in net exports rather than by an increase in domestic production, 
given that an economy has a higher marginal propensity to import.  
Another hypothesis for the undermined fiscal impact on output is that the 
                                                     
4
 It is the average of government spending over the sample period for four countries in the sample 
provided by Ravn et al. (2007). 
5
 The size of the public sector in Hong Kong is defined as the ratio between total public expenditure 
and GDP. 
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expansion of the public sector may crowd out the private sector. Private investment 
is shrinking and is therefore crowding out the fiscal effect on output. To verify such a 
claim, robustness testing is conducted. 
 
3.2.3. Robustness Testing 
Examining the validity of the modified SVAR model before verifying the 
crowding out effect is necessary. It is possible that the ordering of the recursive 
system from the Cholesky decomposition has a function in the SVAR estimation (i.e., 
the ordering of the variables matters in the estimation). A new reordering of the 
structural form is expressed as:  
     (3) 
Given the same Cholesky decomposition and the lag operator in the SVAR 
model, the order of variables is interchanged between output and consumption, net 
export ratio, and real exchange rate. The estimation of structural form (3) is 
presented in Figure 9. The impulse response for each variable is almost identical to 
the modified model in structural form (2). 
Another reordering of the structural form is subjected to the robustness check. 
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The order of variables is reversed completely from the output to the real exchange 
rate. The new ordering of the modified SVAR model is in the following form: 
     (4) 
The estimation of structural form (4) is illustrated in Figure 10. The impulse 
response for each variable is similar to the modified model with structural form (2). 
Various specifications of the modified model do not appear to have any significant 
influence on the estimation. Overall, the estimation from the modified model is 
robust, and can be adopted for further fiscal analysis. 
 
3.2.4. Crowding Out Effect  
 The most intuitive method for observing the crowding out effect is to directly 
introduce the investment variable into the modified model. However, due to limited 
observations, further expansion of the model by introducing additional variables is 
infeasible. The coefficients may not be identified given the quadratic expansion of 
the matrix in the SVAR model. The introduction of the investment variable also 
creates problems of exact collinearity with the existing variables. An alternative 
method is the replacement of the existing variables. The investment variable can 
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replace the output variable as follows: 
     (5) 
 denotes the investment variable with the treatment. The structural form and 
the lag operator are identical to the modified model. Figure 11 illustrates the 
impulse response of the government expenditure on investment, consumption, net 
export ratio, and real exchange rate. A 1 percent positive innovation in government 
expenditure raises the investment by 0.33 percent within a year, whereas the other 
impulse responses are consistent with the estimation from the modified model 
quantitatively. The result indicates that the hypothesis that government expenditure 
crowds out private investment may be inaccurate in Hong Kong.  
For further verification of the fiscal effect on investment, another replacement 
of the investment variable is conducted. Instead of replacing the output variable as 
structural form (5), consumption is replaced by investment as follows:  
     (6) 
Figure 12 illustrates the impulse response of the fiscal impact on output, 
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investment, net export ratio, and real exchange rate for structural form (6). When 
the results are compared to the impulse response in Figure 9, the responses are 
consistent with previous estimation in general. Investment is stimulated by a 
positive innovation in government expenditure, which contradicts the prediction of 
the crowding out effect. Thus, the crowding out effect does not explain the 
undermined fiscal effect on output in Hong Kong.  
The remaining possible explanation is the compositional effect of government 
expenditure. Ilzetzki et al. (2010) suggested that the composition of government 
expenditure is a crucial determinant of the fiscal multiplier. The nature of 
expenditure may matter in the aggregate fiscal effect. For determining the fiscal 
effects of specific types of policy expenditure, further disaggregation of the fiscal 
expenditure is necessary. 
 
4. Fiscal Effects by Policy Category 
4.1. Decomposition of Government Expenditure 
According to the classifications provided in the Hong Kong government budget, 
nine categories of policy expenditure are disaggregated from the total government 
expenditure. These categories are community services 6  (denoted as COMM), 
                                                     
6
 For simplicity, the policy spending on environment and food is aggregated with the spending on 
community and external affairs under the community services category. 
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economic (denoted as ECON), education (denoted as EDU), health (denoted as 
HEALTH), housing (denoted as HOUSE), infrastructure (denoted as INFRA), security 
(denoted as SECU), social welfare (denoted as SW), and support (denoted as 
SUPPORT). The detailed classification of each category of spending is listed in 
Appendix A.  
The consistent classification of policy expenditure data is indicated in the 
Appendix of the Hong Kong Budget since fiscal year 1989–1990. Instead of quarterly 
data, only annual data are available for the nine categories of expenditure. To fit 
with the other quarterly data in the model, the annual data are transformed into 
quarterly data according to the ratio of total government expenditure in each 
quarter. The expenditure in each policy category is assumed to follow a pattern 
similar to the total government expenditure within a year. The treatment of each 
policy expenditure variable would be identical to the total government expenditure, 
, in the modified model.  would be replaced one by one in the estimation of a 
particular policy expenditure. 
 
4.2. Estimation of Fiscal Impulse by Policy Category 
4.2.1. Total Expenditure by Policy 
Figures 13 to 21 present the estimations of fiscal impulse from the nine 
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categories of total expenditure. The results vary between each policy category. The 
impulse from five policies (community services, economic, education, housing, and 
social welfare) does not correspond to the benchmark results qualitatively. However, 
the remaining four policies (infrastructure, health, security, and support) have 
results similar to those of the estimation from the modified model qualitatively. 
Among all types of policy spending, security spending has the greatest fiscal impact. 
A 1 percent increase in security spending leads to a 0.17 percent increase in output, 
a 0.36 percent increase in consumption, and the reduction of the trade balance and 
real exchange rate by 0.19 percent and 0.25 percent, respectively. However, the 
impact disappears after five quarters. Meanwhile, the impact from infrastructure 
spending is sustained for over 10 quarters without diminishing, probably because 
the implementation period of an infrastructure project is usually longer than the 
other policies. The impact therefore persists much longer than the others. 
Nevertheless, the finding that over half of the policy fiscal impulses are 
contrary to the benchmark result is unsatisfactory. The nature of expenditure 
possibly matters in determining the degree of the fiscal impulse. The Hong Kong 
government usually is more concern about on the growth in size of the recurrent 
expenditure rather than the total government expenditure. Recurrent expenditure is 
considered as an operational expense that includes departmental expenses, 
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personal emoluments, and related expenses (The Estimates, 2011). It can also be 
considered as government’s permanent spending. Tang (1997) indicated a guideline 
for financial officers that the recurrent expenditure could not exceed a certain ratio 
of the total expenditure to attain fiscal reserve sufficiency. The special nature of 
recurrent expenditure may have a function in determining the fiscal effect. Thus, 
disaggregating the policy expenditure into recurrent expenditure for further analysis 
is necessary. 
 
4.2.2. Recurrent Expenditure by Policy 
Figures 22 to 30 present the estimations of fiscal impulse from the nine 
categories of recurrent expenditure. The short-run results are consistent with the 
benchmark in general. Within a four-quarter period, the impulse response of 
economic, health, housing, infrastructure, security, and support have corresponding 
results with the estimation of total government expenditure qualitatively. Even 
community services and education spending do not have a positive impact on 
output, and the impulses on other macro variables are still consistent with the 
benchmark results. Compared to the estimation for total expenditure by policy, the 
responses from the recurrent expenditure are much more persuasive in general. 
Given that the recurrent expenditure has over 70 percent share of the total 
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government expenditure,7 the implication is that the degree of fiscal multiplier is 
mainly determined by the innovation in the recurrent expenditure.  
Quantitatively, the recurrent expenditure on infrastructure has the greatest 
fiscal impact among all of the policies. A 1 percent increase in infrastructure 
expenditure leads to a 0.11 percent increase in output, a 0.23 percent increase in 
consumption, and the reduction of the trade balance and the real exchange rate by 
0.38 percent respectively. Similar to the other recurrent spending effects, those 
from infrastructure expenditure disappear after five quarters. Compared to the 
results of total expenditure by policy, infrastructure expenditure also has a 
significant impact on output. Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1991) concluded that 
productive government spending such as that on infrastructure has a positive 
impact on output. The estimation done by Ilzetzki et al. (2010) indicated that an 
increase in government investment causes an increase in output. This finding may 
suggest that the government should concentrate the recurrent expenditure on 
infrastructure to maximize the fiscal multiplier in the short run. 
The only response that does not correspond to the benchmark is the recurrent 
social welfare expenditure. With regard to the detailed spending of the Social 
Welfare Department, more than half of the recurrent social welfare expenditure is 
                                                     
7
 It is the average percentage share of recurrent expenditure to total government expenditure from 
1989 to 2010.  
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contributed to the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) scheme in the 
fiscal year 2011–2012 (The Estimates, 2011). The CSSA is a welfare subsidy scheme 
for the elderly, the disabled, the unemployed, and the poor. The impulse response 
that differs from the other policies may be due to the behaviour of the group of 
unfortunates, who intend to control their consumption in general. They may also 
prefer to be protected by the CSSA scheme, and thus may not have any incentive to 
participate in the labour market. This condition explains why the corresponding 
impulse response is divergent from the standard one.  
The varying degrees of fiscal impact from the categories of recurrent 
expenditure may be the fundamental reason for the undermined fiscal effect on 
output. Figure 31 indicates the percentage of recurrent expenditure by policy. 
Education accounts for over 20 percent of total spending, which is the largest 
proportion, whereas the recurrent expenditure on infrastructure only accounts for 6 
percent on average. The previous estimations reveal that any innovation in 
education expenditure does not have a significant impact on output in the short run. 
Moreover, the recurrent social welfare expenditure, which has a negative impact on 
output, has increased continuously since the early 1990s. Therefore, the large 
proportion of the education and social welfare recurrent expenditure dilutes the 
fiscal impact on output from the other categories of policy expenditure.  
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4.2.3. Non-Recurrent Expenditure by Policy 
Aside from recurrent expenditure, non-recurrent expenditure8 is also included 
in this study. Non-recurrent expenditure is typically regarded as spending on items 
in one-off nature. Any capital expenditure in the various departments is considered 
as non-recurrent expenditure. It is not the main component of Hong Kong fiscal 
spending because it accounts for only 30 percent of the total spending.9 Figures 32 
to 40 present the estimations of fiscal impulse from nine categories of non-recurrent 
expenditure. Most of the results deviate from the benchmark ones. This condition is 
not surprising because non-recurrent expenditure is regarded as capital expenditure 
by nature. Devarajan et al. (1996) suggested that seemingly productive forms of 
spending such as capital expenditure could become unproductive if they are in 
excess.  
Nevertheless, three non-recurrent categories of policy 
expenditure—infrastructure, security, and social welfare—correspond to the 
benchmark result. Infrastructure and security have significant effects on the 
previous estimations of total and recurrent expenditure, whereas for social welfare, 
                                                     
8
 The definition of non-recurrent expenditure is different from that of the government. Any 
expenditure on items of a one-off nature and costing more $150,000 each but not involving the 
acquisition or construction of a physical asset is considered as non-recurrent expenditure by the 
government. In this thesis, non-recurrent expenditure refers to any expenditure excluding recurrent 
expenditure, which includes capital expenditure and non-recurrent expenditure from the operating 
account.  
9
 It is the average percentage share of non-recurrent expenditure to total government expenditure 
from 1989 to 2010. 
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the results are counterintuitive. This fact may be due to the practice of one-off 
welfare distribution in recent years. The recipients are the majority of the public 
instead of specific groups. Therefore, the response of non-recurrent social welfare 
expenditure is similar to tax reduction or transfers, which are also similar to the 
conventional response of a positive innovation in government expenditure.  
 
5. Comparison of the Fiscal Effects between “Asian Dragons” 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea are considered as advanced 
small open economy in Asia. They are also commonly known as “Four Asian 
Dragons”. Still they have many distinctive differences. For example in the monetary 
aspect, Hong Kong is the only economy adopting currency board system. In the fiscal 
aspect, only Hong Kong government do not responsible for the national defence 
expenses. In the economic aspect, Hong Kong and Singapore are specialised in 
financial services whereas South Korea and Taiwan are world leaders in 
manufacturing and information technology. 
In order to justify whether the nature of expenditure plays a role in fiscal effect, 
a comparison of the fiscal effects between “Asian Dragons” has been carried out. 
Besides the real exchange rate data which is collected from BIS, others are collected 
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from CEIC database10. Figure 40 to 43 illustrate the impulse response of the fiscal 
impact on Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan economy respectively. A positive 
innovation of the government expenditure induces a reduction in real exchange rate 
in Singapore and Taiwan. The degree of reduction is much more significant than 
Hong Kong. It is due to the flexible exchange rate regime adopted in these two 
economies. It therefore simulates a certain degree of export demand and it can 
explain the reason why the deterioration of trade balance is far less than Hong Kong. 
However for the case of South Korea, the positive innovation of the government 
expenditure induces an insignificant increase in real exchange rate. The trade 
balance in South Korea deteriorates as serious as Hong Kong. 
For the quantitative effect on output, there is a clear distinction between 
“Asian Dragons”. Similar to the estimation in Hong Kong, the impulse response of 
output in Singapore is undermined. The previous findings have suggested that a 
large proportion of the education expenditure dilutes the fiscal impact on output in 
Hong Kong. Besides the national defence, education is the largest public expenditure 
in Singapore. It consisted of about 22 percent of total government expenditure in 
2011.11 The percentage share of education expenditure is similar to the Hong Kong 
government. The estimation in Singapore indicates that a 1 percent increase in the 
                                                     
10
 The time series data for Singapore and South Korea are from 1987 to 2010 while Taiwan is 1987 to 
2009. 
11
 Singapore Budget 2012 
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government expenditure will result in a 0.004 percent increase in output. It is much 
more insignificant than the estimation in Hong Kong. The previous study revealed 
that the fiscal effect on output is related to the nature and the composition of policy 
expenditure. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that the fiscal effect on 
output is undermined in Singapore. 
On the other hand, the education expenditure is less weighted in Taiwan and 
South Korea budget, compared to Hong Kong and Singapore. In 2011, the education 
expenditure share was about 12% in Taiwan12 and about 15% in South Korea13. 
Compositional effect suggests that a lower weighting in some policy expenditures 
which have insignificant impact on output will boost the fiscal effect in general. It is 
expected the fiscal effect on output would be much significant in Taiwan and South 
Korea. Quantitatively, a 1 percent increase in government expenditure will result in 
a 0.1175 percent increase in Taiwan’s output and 0.2958 percent increase in South 
Korea’s output. The results of Taiwan and South Korea indicate that they have a 
substantial fiscal impact on output, compared with the estimation in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. It further suggests that the nature and the composition of policy 
expenditure matters for the fiscal effects. 
 
                                                     
12
 The General Budget Proposal of Central Government, Taiwan 
13
 OECD National Accounts 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis attempts to identify the fiscal effects on the macro economy in Hong 
Kong by adopting the SVAR approach. The model proposed by Ravn et al. (2007) is 
selected as the benchmark model because it is supported by the DSGE framework 
that has a micro-foundation. However, the model cannot be employed without 
modification because it does not incorporate certain features of the Hong Kong 
economy, such as openness to trade. The introduction of the international block, 
which is the MSCI AC Pacific Index, can solve the problem; the estimations from the 
modified model correspond to the findings of Ravn et al. (2007) qualitatively.  
For the quantitative study, the fiscal multiplier in Hong Kong is significantly less 
than that of the four industrialized countries. The crowding out effect on investment 
is considered as a reason, but it is refuted immediately by the estimation of the 
replacement variables. The severe deterioration of the trade balance may explain a 
certain degree of the reduction of the multiplier, given Hong Kong’s high marginal 
propensity to import.  
More importantly, the compositional effect of the policy expenditure is the 
fundamental reason for the undermined fiscal multiplier. The large proportion of 
education expenditure in the budget, which has an insignificant impact on output, 
dilutes the fiscal effects generated from the other categories of policy expenditure. 
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The recurrent social welfare expenditure, which increases continuously, also reduces 
the positive fiscal impact on output. Moreover, the decomposition of expenditure 
reveals that the innovation in recurrent expenditure is a crucial determinant of the 
fiscal effect. The comparison of the other “Asian Dragons” provides further evidence 
showing the compositional effect of the policy expenditure does matter on the 
quantitative effect of fiscal policy. 
From the viewpoint of policymakers, infrastructure should be the primary 
expenditure during a recession. The innovation in the total infrastructure 
expenditure has a persistent expansionary effect on output. The recurrent 
expenditure on infrastructure has the strongest impact on output among all of the 
policies. Thus, concentrating the government expenditure on infrastructure can 
maximize the expansionary fiscal effect on output in the short run. 
Finally, we have two remarks on the methodology and the interpretation of this 
study’s results. Given the transformation of annual data into quarterly data, it is 
assumed that the expenditure in each policy category follows a pattern similar to 
the total spending within a year. The non-cointegration of the pattern of policy 
expenditure is possible. Smoothing the quarterly data through the moving average 
method and including four quarters of lags in the SVAR model can address the 
potential problem generated by the transformation.  
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Furthermore, the proposed policy recommendation should be interpreted with 
caution. The policy recommendation is based on the impulse response, which is 
estimated from the modified SVAR model. The SVAR approach is particularly 
effective for short-run analysis, but it has limited explanatory power in estimating 
long-run fiscal effects. In other words, the insignificant impact from specific 
categories of policy expenditure should not be taken to mean that such policy 
expenditure is unproductive. The long-run impact from policy expenditure is not 
incorporated into the results of this study.  
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Appendix A: Classification of Expenditure by Policy Area Group 
 
Community Services 
District and Community Relations, Recreation, Culture, Amenities and 
Entertainment Licensing, Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Safety, Environmental 
Hygiene, Environmental Protection, Conservation, Power and Sustainable 
Development 
 
Economic 
Air and Sea Communications and Logistics Development, Commerce and Industry, 
Employment and Labour, Financial Services, Information Technology and 
Broadcasting, Manpower Development, Posts, Competition Policy and Consumer 
Protection, Public Safety, Travel and Tourism 
 
Education 
Education 
 
Health  
Health 
 
Housing 
Housing 
 
Infrastructure 
Buildings, Lands, Planning, Heritage Conservation, Greening and Landscape, Land 
and Waterborne Transport, Water Supply, Drainage and Slope Safety 
 
Security 
Administration of Justice, Anti-corruption, Immigration Control, Internal Security, 
Legal Administration, Legal Aid 
 
Social Welfare 
Social Welfare, Women’s Interests 
 
Support 
Central Management of the Civil Service, Complaints Against Maladministration, 
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Intra-Governmental Services, Revenue 
Collection and Financial Control, Support for Members of the Legislative Council 
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Appendix B: Estimations and Figures  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Original Model 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
(Quarterly) 
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Figure 8 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
(Annually) 
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Figure 9 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
Reordering Structural Form (3) 
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Figure 10 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
Reordering Structural Form (4) 
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Figure 11 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
Replacement of Output 
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Figure 12 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure from the Modified Model 
Replacement of Consumption 
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Figure 13 
Impulse Response of Total Community Services Expenditure 
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Figure 14 
Impulse Response of Total Economic Expenditure 
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Figure 15 
Impulse Response of Total Education Expenditure 
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Figure 16 
Impulse Response of Total Health Expenditure 
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Figure 17 
Impulse Response of Total Infrastructure Expenditure 
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Figure 18 
Impulse Response of Total Housing Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Respon e to Cholesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 19 
Impulse Response of Total Security Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E  
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Figure 20 
Impulse Response of Total Support Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Respon e to Ch lesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 21 
Impulse Response of Total Social Welfare Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D  In ovations with 2 S E. 
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Figure 22 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Community Services Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D  In ovations with 2 S E. 
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Figure 23 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Economic Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 24 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Education Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with  . . 
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Figure 25 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Health Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 26 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Housing Expenditure 
 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTHOUSE to DTHOUSE
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTY to DTHOUSE
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTCP to DTHOUSE
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTNXY to DTHOUSE
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTE to DTHOUSE
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ?2 S.E.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with  S.  
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Figure 27 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Infrastructure Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D  In ovations with 2 S E. 
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Figure 28 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Security Expenditure 
 
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTSECU to DTSECU
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTY to DTSECU
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTCP to DTSECU
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTNXY to DTSECU
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DTE to DTSECU
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ?2 S.E.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 29 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Support Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 30 
Impulse Response of Recurrent Social Welfare Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 31 
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Figure 32 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Community Services Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Ch lesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 33 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Economics Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. In ovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 34 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Education Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 35 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Health Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Ch lesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 36 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Housing Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with  S. . 
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Figure 37 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Infrastructure Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. In ovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 38 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Security Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
 
71 
 
Figure 39 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Support Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Respon e to Ch lesky One S.D. Innovati ns with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 40 
Impulse Response of Non-Recurrent Social Welfare Expenditure 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Ch lesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 41 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure (Singapore) 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 42 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure (South Korea) 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
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Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
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Figure 43 
Impulse Response of Total Government Expenditure (Taiwan) 
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DT: Detrended 
CP: Consumption 
E: Real exchange rate 
NXY: Trade balance over output ratio 
Y: Output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations with 2 S.E. 
 
